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9.1 Introduction
In April of 1981, federally chartered thrift institutions were permitted to
originate adjustable rate mortgages. Prior to this, thrifts primarily originated
long-term fixed rate mortgages. As a result, since thrifts are primarily fi-
nanced with short-term deposits, a gap between their asset and liability matur-
ities arose, thereby exposing thrifts to considerable interest rate risk. Adjust-
able rate mortgages reduce a thrift's gap, and hence its interest rate risk, since
coupon rates vary with the thrift's cost of funds.
As expected, the origination of adjustable rate mortgages became prevalent
with thrift institutions. After falling from 75 percent of total thrift originations
in August 1984 to 21 percent of originations in June 1986, adjustable rate
mortgages rose to an average of 71 percent of originations during 1988. Cur-
rently, approximately $300 billion of adjustable rate mortgages are outstand-
ing. However, as the ongoing thrift crisis would indicate, adjustable rate mort-
gages did not eliminate thrifts' interest rate risk exposure.
Adjustable rate mortgage originators remain exposed to interest rate risk
since the many contractual features of a typical adjustable rate mortgage result
in an imperfect adjustment of its coupon rate to changes in the thrift's cost of
funds. For example, Section 3806 of the Alternative Mortgage Transaction
Parity Act of 1982 states that "adjustable rate mortgage loans originated by a
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creditor shall include a limitation on the maximum interest rate that may apply
during the term of the mortgage loan" (p. 4361).' The presence of a lifetime
cap, as well as other contractual features, prevents a timely and full adjust-
ment in the adjustable rate mortgage's coupon rate to changes in a thrift's cost
of funds.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the interest rate risk exposure of
thrifts originating adjustable rate mortgages arising from the various contrac-
tual features of these mortgage instruments. In particular, we consider how
the resultant interest rate risk exposure varies with the adjustable rate mort-
gage's lifetime cap, periodic cap, adjustment period, teaser rate, and margin.
In addition to quantifying this interest rate risk exposure, we also investigate
various means of minimizing it. Given the potentially considerable interest
rate risk exposure due to the inclusion of lifetime cap provisions, we value
lifetime cap insurance which insures against the adjustable rate mortgage's
coupon rate exceeding its lifetime cap. We also discuss dynamic hedging
strategies which, in lieu of purchasing insurance, can be pursued by thrifts to
minimize the interest rate risk associated with the origination of adjustable
rate mortgages.
We investigate these various issues within a two-factor adjustable rate mort-
gage valuation framework which explicitly takes into account the essential
contractual features of the adjustable rate mortgage as well as the prepayment
behavior of borrowers. Other studies which have investigated the valuation of
adjustable rate mortgages include Buser, Hendershott, and Sanders (1985)
and Kau et al. (1985). By comparison, both of these studies assume a one-
factor framework and ignore the prepayment behavior of borrowers.
In this paper we abstract from the possibility of default by either the bor-
rower or the originating thrift institution. The borrower's default risk can be
taken into account by charging an appropriate default insurance premium (see
Schwartz and Torous 1990). For our purposes here, this insurance premium
can be assumed to be included in the adjustable rate mortgage's servicing fee.
By contrast, we do not deal with the potential strategic behavior of an origi-
nating thrift institution in financial distress.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 9.2 we detail the various
contractual features of adjustable rate mortgages. An understanding of these
contractual features is necessary to analyze why an adjustable rate mortgage's
coupon rate is typically not perfectly indexed to a thrift's cost of funds. Sec-
tion 9.3 details our two-factor adjustable rate mortgage valuation model. Fol-
lowing Brennan and Schwartz (1982) and Schwartz and Torous (1989), we
take the two factors to be the instantaneously riskless rate of interest and the
yield on a default-free consol bond. Monte Carlo simulation techniques are
used to value adjustable rate mortgages and various cap options embedded in
them, as well as to determine the fair fee to charge for lifetime cap insurance.
We present these valuation results in section 9.4. In section 9.5 we discuss
various techniques to dynamically hedge adjustable rate mortgages' interest285 Caps on Adjustable Rate Mortgages
rate risk. Section 9.6 provides our conclusions and suggests policy implica-
tions arising from this research.
9.2 Contractual Features of Adjustable Rate Mortgages
An ideal adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) would have a coupon rate which
adjusts to perfectly reflect changes in the originating thrift's cost of funds. The
thrift's assets and liabilities would then be perfectly matched, thereby elimi-
nating interest rate risk. However, in practice the various contractual features
of an ARM typically prevent its coupon rate from perfectly responding to
changes in a thrift's cost of funds. In this section, we summarize the essential
contractual features of ARMs, emphasizing how these features may prevent
the ARM coupon rate from being perfectly indexed to the originating thrift's
cost of funds and, as such, exposing the thrift to interest rate risk. For further
details regarding the various contractual features of ARMs, see Bartholomew,
Berk, and Roll (1986).
9.2.1 Index
The ARM's coupon rate varies directly with its contractually specified in-
dex. The two most widely used indices are a cost of funds index (COFI) and
a constant maturity (1 year or 5 year) Treasury yield index. The former repre-
sents a weighted average of the actual book cost of funds of thrifts located in
the Federal Home Loan Bank's eleventh district (Arizona, California, and Ne-
vada), while the latter is constructed from the current yields of 1-year or 5-
year Treasury securities.
To the extent that a COFI reflects the book rather than market cost of a
thrift's funds, changes in this index will not perfectly reflect changes in market
interest rate conditions. Similarly, while levels of the Treasury yield indices
move extremely closely with levels of corresponding market Treasury rates,
the empirical analysis of Roll (1987) concludes that the method of construct-
ing these indices significantly reduces the correlation between changes in
these indices and changes in corresponding market rates. As a result, changes
in the coupon rate of an ARM based on a Treasury yield index will also not
perfectly reflect changes in market interest rate conditions.
9.2.2 Margin
The ARM's coupon rate equals the prevailing level of the index plus the
contractually specified margin, subject to initial discounts and restrictions to
be discussed shortly. The margin on ARMs have remained relatively level
over the recent past. For example, from January 1986 through April 1989, the
margin over index for ARMs based on the 1 -year Treasury yield index aver-
aged between 200 and 300 basis points (see Gordon, Luytjes, and Feid 1989).
The size of the margin reflects the value of the various options embedded in286 Eduardo S. Schwartz and Walter N. Torous
the ARM, including the option to prepay, as well as the costs of servicing the
underlying loan.
9.2.3 Adjustment Period
An ARM's coupon rate is not continuously adjusted to changes in the level
of the underlying index, but rather is adjusted periodically at a contractually
stipulated frequency. An ARM's adjustment period is the minimum period of
time over which its coupon rate cannot be changed. Typical adjustment peri-
ods are six months or one year. Clearly, the higher an ARM's adjustment fre-
quency, the more responsive its coupon rate will be to changes in current mar-
ket conditions. The fact that ARMs are not continuously adjusted prevents
ARM coupon rates from perfectly responding to changes in thrifts' cost of
funds.
9.2.4 Teaser Rate
At origination the ARM coupon rate is frequently set below its fully in-
dexed level, index plus margin, so as to provide an initial inducement to the
borrower. This initial coupon rate is referred to as the ARM's teaser rate.
Typically the teaser rate is in effect for the initial adjustment period. The last
few years have seen thrifts more often utilizing teaser rates, offering increas-
ingly larger discounts from the fully indexed loan rate. For example, the size
of this discount on ARMS based on a 1-year Treasury index rose sharply from
an average of 0.3 percent in late 1986 to an average of 3 percent in late 1988,
further increasing to an average of 3.5 percent in early 1989 (see Gordon,
Luytjes, and Feid 1989). It has been suggested that the size of this discount
has now grown to where new ARM originations are no longer profitable,
thereby contributing to the ongoing thrift crisis.
9.2.5 Lifetime Cap
An ARM's lifetime cap contractually stipulates an upper bound which its
coupon rate cannot exceed. In other words, if at adjustment the fully indexed
loan rate exceeds the lifetime cap, then the ARM's coupon rate remains at the
lifetime cap. The ARM's coupon rate is fixed at the lifetime cap until the fully
indexed loan rate falls below the lifetime cap at a subsequent adjustment.
Section 3806 of the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982 re-
quires that all ARMs be subject to a lifetime cap provision. Typically a 5 or 6
percent maximum change in an ARM's coupon rate relative to its teaser rate
is permitted over the life of a loan based on a 1-year Treasury index. Lifetime
caps subject the ARM originator to potentially significant interest rate risk as
the ARM coupon rate is contractually prevented from fully responding to sig-
nificant increases in the thrift's cost of funds.
9.2.6 Lifetime Floor
An ARM's lifetime floor contractually stipulates a lower bound below
which the ARM's coupon rate cannot fall. That is, the ARM coupon remains287 Caps on Adjustable Rate Mortgages
at the floor if the fully indexed loan rate falls below the floor. As opposed to
the lifetime cap, which is beneficial to the borrower, the inclusion of a lifetime
floor is generally viewed as being advantageous to the originator. However, it
should be noted that the lifetime floor will typically not be binding since most
interest-sensitive borrowers will prepay at sufficiently low interest rates in or-
der to lock in low fixed refinancing rates.
9.2.7 Periodic Cap
The periodic cap limits the amount by which the ARM coupon rate can
change, in either direction, over any adjustment period. In other words, if the
underlying index increases or decreases by more than the periodic cap, the
ARM coupon rate changes only by the magnitude of the periodic cap.
2 Typi-
cally, ARMs based on a 1-year Treasury index feature periodic caps of 2 per-
cent per year. Periodic caps effect lags in adjustments of the ARM coupon rate
to changes in a thrift's cost of funds, though in the case of falling interest rates
the consequence would be beneficial to the originator.
While the above discussion has concentrated on each contractual feature of
an ARM in isolation, it should be emphasized that these various features may
potentially interact with one another. For example, the fact that the teaser rate
is usually set well below the fully indexed loan rate implies that the periodic
cap will almost certainly be binding at the ARM's first adjustment. It is im-
portant to jointly model all of these institutional features to fully capture these
interactions and to therefore properly value ARMs.
9.3 A Two-Factor ARM Valuation Model
In this section we develop a two-factor model to value ARMs which takes
into account their previously described institutional features. The model al-
lows us to examine the pricing of lifetime cap insurance, other options embed-
ded in ARMs, and the dynamic hedging of these mortgage instruments. Our
analysis is couched in perfect frictionless markets and, therefore, we ignore
transaction costs, such as points charged at the ARM's origination.
The point of departure of our ARM valuation model is Brennan and
Schwartz's (1982) two-factor model of the term structure of default-free inter-
est rates. This model assumes that all relevant information about the term
structure can be summarized by the instantaneous riskless rate of interest (the
"short rate") and the continuously compounded yield on a default-free consol
bond (the "long rate"). Given the assumed dynamics of the short and long
rates, an absence of arbitrage opportunities yields the fundamental ARM val-
uation equation which must be solved subject to appropriate boundary and
terminal conditions.
To properly value ARMs it is important to model borrowers' prepayment
behavior. Despite the fact that ARM coupon rates tend to vary with market
interest rate conditions, the empirical analysis of Bartholomew, Berk, and288 Eduardo S. Schwartz and Walter N. Torous
Roll (1988) documents that ARM borrowers tend to prepay when refinancing
rates are low in order to lock in what they believe are low fixed rates. Clearly
a failure to properly model this prepayment behavior will result in the system-
atic mispricing of ARMs. We incorporate prepayment behavior by specifying
the borrower's prepayment function, which gives the conditional probability
of a borrower prepaying an ARM, as a proportional hazards model (Green
and Shoven 1986). The baseline hazard function measures the effect of sea-
soning, or mortgage age, on prepayment behavior. However, the conditional
probability of prepayment does not depend solely upon the ARM's age. Our
prepayment function recognizes that prevailing interest rate conditions also
influence the prepayment decision of the ARM borrower.
9.3.1 ARM Cash Flows
We consider a fully amortizing mortgage having an original principal of
P(0) and an original term to maturity of T years with a continuously com-
pounded teaser rate of c(0). As a result, the ARM's continuous payout rate
over the initial adjustment period is C(0) where
C(0) = c(0)/>(0)/(l - exp(-c(O)D).
The loan's principal outstanding, P(t), during the initial adjustment period is
given by
P(t) = P(0)(l - exp(-c(0)(r - f)))/(l - exp(-c(O)r)).
At the ARM's ith adjustment, at time tn given a coupon rate of c(tt), the
ARM's payout rate, C(tt), is now given by
C(t,) = <#,)P(O/(1 " exp(-c(O(r - ?,.))),
while during the rth adjustment period the loan's principal outstanding is given
by
P(t) = P(O(1 - exp(-c(f,)(r - /)))/(1 - exp(-c(/,)(r - *,))).
The ARM's coupon rate at adjustment is determined by adding the contrac-
tually specified margin, m, to the prevailing level of the underlying index,
x(t), subject to the ARM's lifetime and periodic cap constraints. Let c*(r.)
represent the fully indexed loan rate in the absence of any cap constraints:
c*(tt) = x(t.) + m.
If c*(/() > c(t;_,), then the ARM's coupon rate is given by
r,) = min[c*(r.), cL,c(tt_x) + p],
where cL denotes the ARM's lifetime cap and/? the ARM's periodic cap. Con-
versely, if c*(tt) < c(r;_,), then the ARM's coupon rate is given by
= max[ c*(r.), cF, c(r,._,) - p],
where cF denotes the ARM's lifetime floor.289 Caps on Adjustable Rate Mortgages
These ARM cash flows represent the mortgagor's contractual interest and
repayment of principal, and typically include a servicing fee to the originator.
However, since we are interested in the market valuation of the ARM, we
must explicitly take into account any included servicing fee. We do so by
subtracting an exogenously specified servicing fee, s, from these cash flows:
Cit) - sP{t).
The ARM's value reflects the investor's receipt of these cash flows, subject to
the loan's prepayment.
9.3.2 Prepayment Function
We assume that the mortgagor's annualized conditional probability of pre-
payment depends upon the mortgage's age as well as prevailing interest rate
conditions, and is given by the following proportional hazards model:
(1) TT(X, t) = TT0 (0
The baseline hazard function, iro(0, measures the effect of seasoning on
prepayment behavior. We assume that the baseline hazard function is given by
100 percent of Public Securities Association (PSA) experience:
iro(0 = min(0.024r,0.06).
That is, the annualized baseline probability of prepayment is zero at the
ARM's origination, increases by 0.002 per month for the first thirty months
of the ARM's life, and then remains constant at an annualized rate of 0.06
from the thirtieth month until maturity.
Prevailing interest rate conditions also influence the mortgagor's prepay-
ment decision. To model interest-sensitive ARM prepayments, we include a
single covariate measuring the difference between the underlying index's level
at origination, x(0), and its prevailing level, x(t). The higher the prevailing
level of the index relative to its level at the ARM's origination, the lower the
probability of prepayment, conditional on the ARM not having been previ-
ously prepaid. We can interpret (3 as measuring the speed of prepayment. The
larger is (B, ceteris paribus, the more sensitive are ARM prepayments to pre-
vailing interest rate conditions.
9.3.3 Valuation Equation
The dynamics of the state variables, the short rate r and the long rate /, are
assumed to be given by
(2) dr = (a, + bx (/ - r))dt + uxrdzx
and
(3) dl = l(a2 + b2r + c2l)dt + a2ldz2,
where z, and z2 are standardized Wiener processes. Increments to z, and z2 are
assumed instantaneously correlated:290 Eduardo S. Schwartz and Walter N. Torous
(4) dzxdz2 = pdt.
In the absence of arbitrage opportunities the value of the ARM, V(rJ,t),
must satisfy the following second-order partial differential equation:
Vir
2v
2Vrr + r/pa,a2Vr/ + ViPvlV,, + (ax + bx(l - r) - kvxr)Vr
(5) + /(oi + / - r)V, + V, - (r + TT)V
+ irP(t) + iC(t) - sP{t)) = 0,
where X is the market price of short-term interest rate risk. Since the ARM is
fully amortizing, the following terminal condition must be satisfied:
(6) V{r,l,T) = 0.
9.3.4 Monte Carlo Simulation Solution Technique
When cash flows are path dependent, the most efficient numerical method
for solving the partial differential equation (eq. [5]), subject to the corre-
sponding terminal condition (eq. [6]), is provided by Monte Carlo solution
techniques (see Boyle 1977, and Schwartz and Torous 1989). This is particu-
larly so in our valuation framework where the cash flows depend upon past
coupon rates.
Monte Carlo simulation methods require that r and / are generated by the
following correlated risk-adjusted stochastic processes:
(2') dr = (ax + bx(l - r) - \vxr)dt + vxrdzx
and
(3') dl = /(cr* + / - r)dt + (J2ldz2.
To value an ARM, we generate correlated normal random variables corre-
sponding to r and / at every month during the ARM's life. At each adjustment
we set the ARM's coupon rate as previously discussed in section 9.3.1, and
consequently each month determine the ARM's cash flows—contractually
obligated plus prepayments. The present value of these cash flows provides a
realization of the ARM's value. By repeating this procedure, the average of
these realizations gives the required solution of the partial differential equa-
tion.
9.3.5 Equilibrium Valuation of Cap Options and the Fair Lifetime Cap
Insurance Fee
We can use our ARM valuation procedures to determine the equilibrium
values of lifetime and periodic cap options embedded in ARMs as well as the
fair fee to charge for lifetime cap insurance.
For example, subtracting the value of an ARM with both lifetime and peri-
odic caps from the value of an otherwise identical ARM without the lifetime
cap gives the value of the lifetime cap option. Similarly, by subtracting the291 Caps on Adjustable Rate Mortgages
value of an ARM without the lifetime cap from the value of an otherwise
identical ARM without both lifetime and periodic caps gives the value of the
periodic cap option.
Lifetime cap insurance insures against the ARM's coupon rate exceeding
its lifetime cap. The fair lifetime cap insurance fee is simply that premium
which will make an ARM without a lifetime cap have the same value as an
otherwise identical ARM with a lifetime cap. The larger the fair lifetime cap
insurance fee, the greater the probability that the ARM's lifetime cap will be
binding, and therefore the greater the interest rate risk.
9.4 Valuation Results
This section documents the magnitudes as well as sensitivities of periodic
cap options, lifetime cap options, and the fair lifetime cap insurance fee to
systematic changes in ARM features. These results will provide insights into
the determinants of an ARM originator's interest rate risk exposure. Clearly
the greater the interest rate risk exposure of an ARM originator, the greater
the possibility of the thrift's financial distress.
Since we are interested in systematically varying the features of an ARM,
we require a base case against which to compare these results. For this pur-
pose we consider the following 30-year ARM offered by a southern California
thrift in December 1989 which was representative of available ARMs:
index = 1-year Treasury index
lifetime cap =14 percent
lifetime floor = 8 percent
periodic cap = 1 percent
teaser rate = 8 percent
adjustment period = 1 year
margin = 2.75 percent.
Our valuation analysis assumes that the originating thrift requires a fee of 1
percent to service this ARM. Also, interest rate conditions prevailing in De-
cember 1989 are summarized by a short rate of r — 8 percent and a long rate
of / = 9 percent.
Notice that our base case ARM is indexed to a short-term riskless rate of
interest. While our valuation framework can accommodate a variety of index
specifications, we assume that the ARM's coupon rate is perfectly indexed to
the short rate r in order to simplify the subsequent analysis. This assumption
is consistent with ARMs being indexed to relatively short-term, as opposed to
relatively long-term, rates of interest. However, as a result of this simplifying
assumption, our subsequent analysis does not investigate the interest rate risk
exposure of an ARM originator owing to changes in the ARM's index not
being perfectly correlated with changes in market interest rate conditions.
The risk-adjusted interest rate processes (eqs. [2'] and [3']) characterize the292 Eduardo S. Schwartz and Walter N. Torous
interest rate environment in which we value ARMs. The parameters of the
risk-adjusted interest rate processes used here are taken from Schwartz and
Torous (1989). There the short rate is approximated by the annualized one-
month CD rate, while the long rate is approximated by the annualized running
coupon yield on long-term treasury bonds. Given these data over the sample
period December 1982 through April 1987, together with an estimate of the
market price of short-term interest rate risk of —0.01, the corresponding
maximum-likelihood parameter estimates of the risk-adjusted interest rate
processes are summarized as follows:
Ar = (-0.0416 + 1.987(7 - r) - (-0.01)(0.189)r)Af + 0.189rAz,,
M = /(0.125
2 + / - r)Ar + 0.125/Az2,
with an estimated correlation coefficient of 0.373.
To complete the characterization of our ARM valuation framework, we
must explicitly specify the parameters of the prepayment function. As men-
tioned earlier, we assume that the baseline hazard function is given by 100
percent of PSA experience. Rather than estimate the speed of prepayment
parameter pi from ARM prepayment data, we determine that particular value
of P which results in our model valuing the base-case ARM at par at origina-
tion. As a result, we imply an ex ante £ estimate of 41.4. Assuming the appro-
priateness of our valuation framework, the advantage of implying the speed of
prepayment parameter is that it provides a forward-looking estimate which
reflects anticipated prepayment behavior.
Given that the base-case ARM is valued at par or $100 at origination,
3 the
corresponding value of the base-case ARM's lifetime cap option is $1.87,
which translates into an annualized fair lifetime cap insurance fee of 31 basis
points. The corresponding value of the base-case ARM's periodic cap option
is $5.58. The relatively large value of the periodic cap option reflects the fact
that with a teaser rate of 8 percent and an initial fully indexed loan rate of
10.75 percent, the periodic cap of 1 percent will most likely be binding at
future adjustments of the base-case ARM's coupon rate. By contrast, for a
more typical periodic cap of 2 percent and holding all other features fixed, the
value of the ARM's lifetime cap option increases to $3.74, which translates
into a fair lifetime cap insurance fee of 61 basis points, while the value of the
ARM's periodic cap option decreases to $1.81. These changes reflect the fact
that the periodic cap is now less likely to be binding at future coupon rate
adjustments.
Our subsequent analysis, summarized in table 9.1 and figures 9.1-9.6, ex-
amines the sensitivities of cap option values and fair lifetime cap insurance




Panel A of table 9.1 documents the sensitivities of ARM cap option values
to changes in the level of the ARM's lifetime cap. We consider lifetime capsTable 9.1 Value of Cap Options as a Function of ARM'S Features
Panel A
Lifetime cap (%) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Value of lifetime 7.63 5.41 3.82 2.68 1.87 1.28 0.87 0.57 0.37 0.24 0.14
cap option ($)
Fair lifetime cap 126 89 63 44 31 21 14 9 6 4 2
insurance
(basis points)
Value of periodic 5.46 5.50 5.54 5.56 5.58 5.60 5.60 5.61 5.61 5.61 5.62
cap option ($)
Panel B
Lifetime floor 5 6 7 8 9
(%)
Value of lifetime 1.89 1.89 1.87 1.74 1.25
cap option ($)
Fair lifetime cap 31 31 31 29 21
insurance
(basic points)
Value of periodic 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.59
cap option ($)
Panel C
Periodic cap (%) .25 .50 .75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
Value of lifetime 0.00 0.34 1.10 1.87 2.54 3.06 3.46 3.74
cap option ($)
Fair lifetime cap 0 6 18 31 42 50 57 61
insurance
(basis points)
Value of periodic 14.81 10.59 7.63 5.58 4.12 3.09 2.34 1.81
cap option ($)
Panel D
Adjustment 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
period
(months)
Value of lifetime 4.89 3.80 2.72 1.87 1.23 .81 .50 .31 .18 .10
cap option ($)
Fair lifetime cap 80 62 45 31 20 13 8 5 3 2
insurance
(basis points)
Value of periodic 1.09 2.59 4.15 5.58 6.79 7.59 8.36 8.93 9.28 9.56
cap option ($)
Panel E
Teaser rate (%) 6 7 8 9 10 11
Value of lifetime 1.51 1.70 1.87 2.00 2.08 2.14
cap option($)
Fair lifetime cap 25 28 31 33 34 35
insurance
(basis points)
Value of periodic 10.16 7.54 5.58 4.37 3.72 3.03
cap option ($)











1.25 1.75 2.25 2.75 3.25 3.75
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D Lifetime Cap
Fig. 9.1 Value of cap options for different lifetime caps
ranging from 10 to 20 percent in increments of 1 percent. These results are
graphically presented in figure 9.1.
Notice that the value of the lifetime cap option and the corresponding fair
lifetime cap insurance fee decrease with increases in the lifetime cap. For
example, when the lifetime cap is 12 percent the fair lifetime cap insurance
fee is 63 basis points, while for a lifetime cap of 20 percent the fair lifetime
cap insurance fee is reduced to only 2 basis points. This result follows simply
from the fact that the higher the level of the lifetime cap, the lower the proba-
bility of this cap becoming binding.
By contrast, the value of the periodic cap option increases slightly as the
level of the lifetime cap increases. When the lifetime cap is 12 percent the295 Caps on Adjustable Rate Mortgages
periodic cap option is valued at $5.54, while for a lifetime cap of 20 percent
the periodic cap option increases in value to $5.62. Intuitively, as the level of
the lifetime cap increases and, as such, the lifetime cap becomes less bind-
ing, the probability that the periodic cap will become binding increases.
9.4.2 Lifetime Floor
ARM cap option values are extremely insensitive to changes in the level of
the ARM's lifetime floor. We consider lifetime floors ranging from 5 to 9
percent in increments of 1 percent and tabulate the resultant ARM cap option
values in panel B of table 9.1. These results are graphically summarized in
figure 9.2. The reason for the insensitivity of ARM cap option values to
changes in the lifetime floor is that the states of the world in which the lifetime
floor becomes binding are precisely those states of the world in which there
exists a financial incentive for borrowers to prepay. These results indicate that
the lifetime floor option, which is viewed as being beneficial to the ARM
originator, is practically worthless. As a result, the lifetime cap option embed-
ded in ARMs typically derives value only from its upper cap.
9.4.3 Periodic Cap
We tabulate the sensitivities of ARM cap option values to changes in the
level of the periodic cap in panel C of table 9.1. The periodic cap ranges from
0.25 to 2.00 percent in increments of 0.25 percent, while maintaining a 12-
month adjustment period. These results are graphically depicted in figure 9.3.
• Lifetime Co Periodic Cop






Fig. 9.3 Value of cap options for different periodic caps
The value of the lifetime cap option and the corresponding fair lifetime cap
insurance fee increase with increases in the level of the periodic cap. For a
periodic cap of 0.25 percent the fair lifetime cap insurance fee is negligible,
but the fee increases to 71 basis points for a periodic cap of 2.00 percent. The
smaller the periodic cap, the less binding a given lifetime cap. For example,
for a periodic cap of 0.25 percent, it would take a minimum of 24 years for a
lifetime cap of 14 percent to be reached from a teaser rate of 8 percent, and
hence the value of the lifetime cap option is negligible.
Conversely, the value of the periodic cap option decreases with increases in
the ARM's periodic cap. For a periodic cap of 0.25 percent, the periodic cap
option is valued at $14.81, while for a periodic cap of 2.00 percent the peri-
odic cap option is valued at $1.81. The smaller the periodic cap, the more
likely it will be binding, and hence the more valuable the periodic cap option.
9.4.4 Adjustment Period
We vary the ARM's adjustment period from 3 months to 30 months, in
increments of 3 months, and document the resultant ARM cap option values
in panel D of table 9.1. Figure 9.4 graphically summarizes these results.
The value of the lifetime cap option and the corresponding fair lifetime cap
insurance fee decrease with the lengthening of the ARM's adjustment period.
For example, for an adjustment period of 3 months the fair lifetime cap insur-
ance fee is 80 basis points, while for an adjustment period of 30 months the
fair insurance fee is only 2 basis points. For a fixed periodic cap, the longer297 Caps on Adjustable Rate Mortgages
it Period (Months)
A Periodic Cap
Fig. 9.4 Value of cap options for different adjustment periods
the adjustment period, the longer, on average, the time required to reach the
ARM's lifetime cap, and hence the less valuable the lifetime cap option. If the
adjustment period is 30 months, it would take a minimum of 15 years to reach
a lifetime cap of 14 percent starting from a teaser rate of 8 percent. In the
limit, as the adjustment period approaches the ARM's original term to matu-
rity, the ARM becomes a fixed rate mortgage and the lifetime cap option be-
comes worthless.
By contrast, the value of the periodic cap option increases with the length-
ening of the ARM's adjustment period. For an adjustment period of 3 months
the periodic cap option is valued at $1.09, while for an adjustment period of
30 months the periodic cap option is valued at $9.56. Intuitively, the longer
the adjustment period, the more likely the periodic cap will be binding.
9.4.5 Teaser Rate
Panel E of table 9.1 reports ARM cap option values as the teaser rate is
varied from 6 to 11 percent in increments of 1 percent. These results are
graphically presented in figure 9.5.
Increases in the teaser rate result in increases in the value of the lifetime cap
option and the corresponding fair lifetime cap insurance fee. For example, for
a teaser rate of 6 percent the fair lifetime cap insurance fee is 25 basis points,
and the fee increases to 35 basis points for a teaser rate of 11 percent. The
higher the teaser rate, the closer the ARM's initial fully indexed loan rate is to




Fig. 9.5 Value of cap options for different teaser rates
However, the value of the periodic cap option decreases with increases in
the teaser rate. For a teaser rate of 6 percent the periodic cap option is valued
at $10.16, while for a teaser rate of 11 percent the periodic cap option is
valued at $3.03. The lower the teaser rate the more valuable is the periodic
cap option, since the initial adjustment in the ARM's coupon to the corre-
sponding fully indexed loan rate will be larger and hence the periodic cap will
be more likely to be binding.
9.4.6 Margin
Finally, panel F of table 9.1 examines the sensitivities of ARM cap option
values to the level of the ARM's margin. The margin is varied from 1.25 to
3.75 percent in increments of 0.25 percent. The results are graphically de-
picted in figure 9.6.
As expected, the value of the lifetime cap option and the corresponding fair
lifetime cap insurance fee increase with increases in the margin. For a margin
of 1.25 percent the fair lifetime cap insurance fee is 14 basis points, while for
a margin of 3.75 percent the fair fee is 41 basis points. The larger the margin,
the greater the possibility that a given lifetime cap will be binding.
Similarly, the value of the periodic cap option increases with increases in
the ARM's margin. For a margin of 1.25 percent the periodic cap option is
valued at $3.94, while for a margin of 3.75 percent the periodic cap option is
valued at $7.60. This result follows from the fact that the larger the margin,
the larger will be the initial adjustment in the ARM's coupon rate to the cor-
responding fully indexed loan rate.299 Caps on Adjustable Rate Mortgages
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Fig. 9.6 Value of cap options for different margins
9.5 Hedging ARM Interest Rate Risk
Our preceding analysis has established that the various contractual features
of ARMs subject originating thrifts to potentially substantial interest rate risk
exposure. For example, the presence of a lifetime cap provision contractually
prevents an ARM's coupon rate from fully responding to significant increases
in a thrift's cost of funds. The thrift's resultant interest rate exposure, as mea-
sured by the corresponding fair lifetime cap insurance fee, can be consider-
able. We now turn our attention to dynamic hedging strategies which will
allow the originating thrift to minimize the interest rate risk exposure arising
from the various contractual features of ARMs. Alternatively, these dynamic
hedging strategies can be implemented by lifetime cap insurers to hedge their
resultant interest rate risk.
Our ARM valuation equation (eq. [5]) is based on dynamic hedging argu-
ments. In other words, assuming that the two factors, r and /, determine the
value of all default-free interest-rate-dependent claims, it is always possible
to form a portfolio of three interest-rate-dependent claims that is insensitive
to instantaneous changes in these factors. Therefore, in the absence of ar-
bitrage opportunities, the instantaneous return to this hedge portfolio must
equal the prevailing instantaneous riskless rate of interest. These arbitrage
arguments yield the partial differential equation (eq. [5]) and also form the
basis for hedging interest rate risk inherent in all interest-rate-contingent
claims.
We note at the outset that we are able to use our valuation framework to300 Eduardo S. Schwartz and Walter N. Torous
fully hedge the interest rate risk associated with the origination of ARMs be-
cause of the following two simplifying assumptions of the model. First, we
assume that the ARM's index is one of the model's state variables. Second,
we assume a prepayment function which depends only on the prevailing value
of the state variable and the mortgage's age, and neglect other demographic
and socioeconomic factors which influence borrowers' prepayment decisions.
Both of these assumptions do not strictly hold in practice, and therefore will
adversely affect our ARM hedging performance. To fully assess these impli-
cations would require further empirical analysis.
To dynamically hedge an ARM's interest rate risk requires offsetting posi-
tions in other interest-rate-sensitive securities. In particular, the ARM's sen-
sitivities to changes in interest rates must be offset by the corresponding sen-
sitivities of these other securities. For illustrative purposes, we assume these
interest-rate-sensitive securities are default-free coupon bonds of varying ma-
turities, although in practice, to minimize transaction costs, this dynamic
hedging strategy would most likely be implemented with interest rate futures.
Table 9.2 documents the sensitivities of the base-case ARM to changes in r
and I,
5 as well as the corresponding sensitivities of 9% continuously com-
pounded coupon, non-amortizing, non-callable, default-free bonds of various
maturities. For example, the base-case ARM's value decreases by 0.30 per-
cent for a 1 percent increase in r from 8 to 9 percent, while a 1 percent increase
in / from 9 to 10 percent will decrease its value by 3.66 percent. By contrast,
the sensitivities of a 1-year 9% coupon bond with respect to these changes in
r and /are — 0.42 percent and — 0.54 percent, respectively.
As expected, lengthening the maturity of the default-free bond decreases its
sensitivity to the short rate and increases its sensitivity to the long rate. Com-
paring these sensitivities, notice that the interest rate sensitivities of the base-
case ARM are similar to the corresponding sensitivities of the 5-year coupon
bond. Despite the fact that the ARM's coupon rate is indexed to the short rate
of interest, its numerous institutional features together with the posited pre-
payment behavior make the ARM's interest rate sensitivities more similar to a
5-year default-free bond as opposed to a default-free bond of shorter term to
maturity.
These sensitivities allow us to formulate a dynamic portfolio strategy in the
Table 9.2 Sensitivies of ARM and Various Default-free Coupon Bonds to
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coupon bonds to hedge the interest rate risk incurred by the originator of the
base-case ARM. Since the ARM represents an asset to the originating thrift,
the structure of its liability portfolio should be such that its sensitivities to the
two factors exactly offset the ARM's corresponding sensitivities.
To be more precise, let
& = V{ I W
and
$ = V> I V
j
be the sensitivities of asset j with respect to r and /, respectively. Assume that
we want to hedge perfectly an investment of X3 dollars in asset 3 (for example,
ARMs) using two other interest-rate-dependent assets, X, dollars in asset 1
and X2 dollars in asset 2 (for example, default-free coupon bonds of differing
maturities), thenX, andX2 satisfy the following system of equations:
and
To complete the perfect hedge, the difference X3 — (X, + X2) must be in-
vested in the instantaneously risk-free asset.
For example, the base-case ARM can be hedged initially by borrowing 51
percent of its value in a 9% 1-year default-free bond, 47 percent in a 9% 10-
year default-free bond, and the remaining 2 percent at the prevailing instanta-
neous risk-free rate. Alternatively, the base-case ARM can be hedged initially
by borrowing 91 percent of its value in a 9% 5-year default-free bond, 2 per-
cent in a 9% 1-year default-free bond, and the remaining 7 percent at the
prevailing instantaneous risk free rate. Finally, we can initially hedge the base-
case ARM by borrowing 95 percent of its value in a 9% 5-year default-free
bond, 7 percent at the prevailing instantaneous risk-free rate, and lending 2
percent of its value in a 9% 10-year default-free bond. Of course, as time
evolves and the levels of the state variables change, the sensitivities of the
base-case ARM and the default-free coupon bonds also change. This implies
that the hedge portfolio in the liabilities must be dynamically adjusted accord-
ing to these revised sensitivities in order to continue to offset the ARM's inter-
est rate sensitivities.
9.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper develops a two-factor model to value adjustable rate mortgages
which integrates their essential contractual features with borrowers' prepay-
ment behavior into a partial equilibrium framework. We value the periodic
and lifetime cap options embedded in ARMs, and determine the fair fee to
charge for insuring the lifetime cap. We investigate the sensitivities of these302 Eduardo S. Schwartz and Walter N. Torous
ARM cap option values and the fair lifetime cap insurance fee to systematic
changes in the ARM's contractual features. Also, we discuss dynamic hedg-
ing strategies which can be used to minimize the interest rate risk exposure
associated with the origination of ARMs.
An important characteristic of ARMs currently available is the great diver-
sity in their contractual features. ARMs differ in their underlying index, mar-
gin, adjustment period, and teaser rate, as well as their lifetime and periodic
cap provisions. Our analysis indicates that all these contractual features must
be jointly modeled to take into account properly their interaction in determin-
ing the value of ARMs.
ARM originators are subject to potentially considerable interest rate risk
exposure. Clearly, the greater the interest rate risk exposure of an ARM origi-
nator, the greater the possibility of the thrift's financial distress. Two ways of
dealing with this interest rate risk are presented. First, the ARM originator
can use dynamic hedging techniques to reduce this risk. Second, the ARM
originator can purchase lifetime cap insurance. To be properly valued, this
lifetime cap insurance should vary with the contractual features of the ARM,
as the originator's corresponding interest rate risk exposure and the possibility
of financial distress also varies with these contractual features.
Notes
1. See Wallace and Wang (1989).
2. In this paper we consider periodic rate caps as opposed to periodic payment caps.
A periodic payment cap imposes a limit on the changes in an ARM's monthly payment;
its effects are similar to those of a periodic rate cap, but can lead to negative amortiza-
tion. For more details, see Bartholomew, Berk, and Roll (1986).
3. To obtain the estimate of a security's value, we replicate our Monte Carlo proce-
dure one thousand times. Standard deviations of all values reported in this paper are on
the order of 0.25 percent.
4. Our sensitivity analysis assumes that prepayment behavior does not vary with the
contractual features of the ARM. A more general analysis would allow for interaction
between prepayments and these contractual features.
5. To numerically compute partial derivatives, we perturbate the initial values of the
state variables and use Monte Carlo simulation methods to compute the resultant secu-
rity value. The difference in security values divided by the magnitude of the perturba-
tion in the respective state variable approximates the partial derivative or dollar sensi-
tivity.
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